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 ABSTRACT 
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We analyze differentiated retail industries where shops engage in two-stage 
competition with respect to opening hours and prices. We explore the effects of 
consumers' shopping time flexibility by comparing bi-directional consumers with 
forward- or backward-oriented consumers, who can either postpone or advance 
their shopping, but not both. We demonstrate that retailers with longer opening 
hours charge higher prices and that opening hour differentiation softens price 
competition. We calculate both symmetric and asymmetric subgame perfect 
equilibria in closing hours and demonstrate how the equilibrium configurations 
depend on the cost increases associated with extended business hours, as well 
as the relative densities of day and night shoppers. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Preiswettbewerb, Öffnungszeiten und Flexibilität der Einkaufszeit 
Wir analysieren unterschiedliche Einzelhandelsindustrien, in denen Läden in 
einem zweistufigen Wettbewerb bezüglich Öffnungszeiten und Preisen stehen. 
Wir erforschen die Effekte von Kundenflexibilität, indem wir völlig flexible 
Kunden mit vor- bzw. rückwärtsorientierten Kunden vergleichen können, welche 
ihren Einkauf nur vorziehen oder verschieben können, aber nicht beides. Wir 
zeigen, dass Einzelhändler mit längeren Öffnungszeiten höhere Preise 
verlangen und dass die Differenzierung der Öffnungszeiten den 
Preiswettbewerb abschwächt. Wir berechnen sowohl symmetrische als auch 
unsymmetrische teilspielperfekte Gleichgewichte für die Öffnungszeiten und 
zeigen, wie die Ausgestaltung der Gleichgewichte von den zusätzlichen Kosten 
der ausgedehnten Öffnungszeiten und der relativen Dichte von Tag- und 
Nachteinkäufern abhängt. 
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1. Introduction
During the past decade, issues related to shopping hour restrictions have been the subject of
repeated and intense debates in many European countries. Countries like Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany and Norway still maintain substantial restrictions on shopping hours. For
example, in Germany up until very recently stores were required to close by 8 p.m. on weekdays,
and by 1 or 2 p.m. on Saturdays, except in city centers where shops typically remained open until 4
p.m. There were some exceptions to these rules during the weekends prior to Christmas. Presently
these regulatory boundary conditions for the retail industry have been considerably liberalized,
but it is still an issue subject to much political debate to determine how far to proceed with
the process of shopping hour liberalization as well as to decide whether shopping hour regulation
should be a federal policy issue or not. Still in Europe, on Sundays there are typically no major
retail activities at all or very limited retail operation in, for example, all the countries mentioned
above. Other European countries, like Sweden and United Kingdom, have taken radical steps
towards a more complete liberalization of trading hours.
In this manuscript we analyze a duopolistic diﬀerentiated retail industry where shops engage
in two-stage competition with respect to opening hours and prices. We demonstrate that the
retailer with the longer opening hours tends to charge a higher price in equilibrium, and also has
a higher overall market share even though it has a lower market share during the period when
both retailers maintain parallel operation. We then calculate the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium in closing hours and demonstrate how the possible equilibrium conﬁgurations depend
in a crucial way on the cost increases associated with extended business hours. We ﬁnd that
the equilibrium business hours are asymmetric for an intermediate range of costs for business
hour expansions. In particular, we investigate the relationship between the emerging business
hour equilibrium and the ﬂexibility of consumers to adjust their shopping times. We carry out
this research task by comparing the business hour equilibrium with bi-directional consumers, who
are able to both advance and postpone their shopping times, to the equilibrium conﬁguration
generated by forward- or backward oriented consumers, who can adjust their shopping times in
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only one direction, i.e., either postponing or advancing. Finally, we explore the welfare implications
of competition in business hours. Our study suggests that competition does not create incentives
for retailers to expand their business hours beyond social optimum. In this respect our model
does not justify restrictions on shopping hours. This conclusion holds true irrespectively of the
degree of ﬂexibility of consumers to adjust their shopping to the business hours.
The existing literature on the eﬀects of a deregulation of shopping hours has largely focused on
exploring the consequences of liberalizing business hour regulations. In that respect the literature
has generated ambiguous predictions. Kay and Morris (1987) present conditions under which
competition in a retail market with homogenous consumers could induce opening at times when
high costs would induce price increases relative to a situation with restricted shopping hours.
In light of their empirical evidence they, however, conclude that deregulation of shopping hours
would in practice lead to lower costs and prices in the retail sector. Tangay, Vallee and Lanoie
(1995) predict that a trade hour deregulation would shift demand from small shops towards large
ones and that this shift in demand makes it possible for large shops to increase prices. In empirical
tests based on Canadian data they found that the Canadian deregulation of opening hours in 1990
has generated price increases at large stores that tend to maintain extensive business hours.
Also more theoretically oriented studies have presented mixed results. Clemenz (1990) shows
that opening hour deregulation may lead to lower retail prices within the framework of a model
with consumer search. The mechanism behind this result is that longer shopping hours facilitate
more extensive search activity, which, in turn, leads to lower retail prices. In a subsequent
study Clemenz (1994) investigates a homogenous market where customers are diﬀerentiated with
respect to their preferred shopping times. Within such a framework he focuses on the polar cases
of monopoly and perfect competition, and he shows that a monopolist will maintain business
hours that exceed the socially optimal opening hours.
In contrast to all the studies mentioned above, in the present study we investigate the welfare
implications of imperfect competition within the framework of a two-stage model where ﬁrms
commit to opening hours in the long run, whereas they are engaged in price competition in the
short run. Thus, our model concentrates on the strategic aspects of the opening hour decision.
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Such a focus we share with the recent study by Inderst and Irmen (forthcoming). Inderst and
Irmen demonstrate the incentives of ﬁrms to use opening hours as an instrument to achieve
product diﬀerentiation, and thereby increase the market power. This is a possible prediction from
our model as well. However, our study is importantly diﬀerentiated from the existing literature as
it explores the relationship between the equilibrium business hour conﬁguration and the ﬂexibility
of consumers to advance or postpone their shopping. We demonstrate that the costs of expanding
shopping hours essentially determine the type of emerging business hour equilibrium, in particular
whether the equilibrium is symmetric or asymmetric, and that this characterization is essentially
linked to the ﬂexibility of consumers to adjust their shopping activities.
The present study is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of a duopolistic retail
industry where the stores compete in two dimensions: Closing hours and prices. Sections 3
and 4 explore the pricing equilibria as functions of possible closing hour conﬁgurations for bi-
directional as well as for forward-or backward-oriented consumers. Section 5 characterizes the
subgame perfect closing hour equilibria. In Section 6 we explore the potential implications for
the regulation of business hours. Finally, we oﬀer some concluding comments in Section 7.
2. A Retail Industry Model of Business Hours
Consider a duopolistic retail industry with two shops, indexed by i = A,B, selling a homogeneous
product to heterogeneous consumers. Let pA denote the price charged by shop A, and pB the
price charged by B. In line with the Hotelling model of product diﬀerentiation, ﬁrm A is located
at the down end of the unit interval, whereas ﬁrm B is located at the upper end of the interval.
Time is indexed continuously on the unit circle. This circle could be interpreted as a single
day. More generally, it portrays the time during which it is possible for people to go shopping.
We divide the possible shopping period into two equal time intervals. We call the time interval
between t = 0 and t = 12 the day period, and the period between t =
1
2 and t = 1 (which is also
back to t = 0) as the night period. Figure 1 illustrates how time is indexed on the unit circle.
Representing time on the unit circle is qualitatively very essential, since it formalizes the idea
3
ﬀn1ﬀn2
...........
...........
t = 0
t = 1
t = 12
...............
DayNight
ﬀ

Figure 1: Time and shoppers on the unit circle.
Remark: Time is measured as the arc-distance from t = 0.
that there are important spillovers between time periods. For example, the option of consumers
to postpone their shopping until early next day serves as an alternative to late night shopping
and, of course, this alternative will aﬀect the business hour decisions of a shop with long opening
hours as it will limit the possibilities to exploit night-time customers through high prices.
We assume that both stores open at t = 0. We let t¯i denote the endogenously-determined
closing time of store i, for i = A,B. Thus, t¯i also denotes the proportion of the time during
which store i (i = A,B) is open.
2.1 Shoppers
The consumers are diﬀerentiated along two dimensions: (i) Preferred shopping time and, (ii)
distance relative to stores’ location. Each point in time t (0 ≤ t ≤ 1) represents an ideal
shopping time for a continuum of potential shoppers, who are further diﬀerentiated according
to their location relative to stores. Thus, each consumer is represented by a coordinate (t, x),
where t is the arc index on the unit circle, and x ∈ [0, 1] captures the customer-speciﬁc horizontal
diﬀerentiation characteristics.
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Within the day period, between t = 0 and t = 12 , consumers are uniformly distributed on the
half-unit circle with density n1, so that the total number of day consumers is n1/2. Similarly the
density of shoppers during the night hours, between t = 12 and t = 1, is n2, so that the total
number of night shoppers is n2/2. Summing up, the total number of all shoppers is (n1 +n2)/2.
Along the dimension [0, 1] the consumers are horizontally diﬀerentiated so that consumers
with an address close to 0 tend to prefer store A, whereas consumers with an address close to 1
tend to prefer store B. Figure 2 illustrates how shoppers would be distributed if we “open” the
time unit circle (in fact, a sphere) into the two-dimensional time-location space.


t
x
Store B: 1
Store A: 0
0 112
Density = n1

ﬀ

“late” shoppers
reside near store B
reside near store A
“early” shoppers
(location)
(ideal shopping
time)
Day Night
Density = n2
Figure 2: “Opened” circle: The distribution of shoppers across locations and ideal shopping time.
The utility of a consumer indexed by the pair (t, x) is1
Ux,t
def=


β − pA − λx shopping at A; store A is open
β − pA − λx − τ min {t − t¯A ; 1 − t} shopping at A; store A is closed
β − pB − λ(1 − x) shopping at B; store B is open
β − pB − λ(1 − x) − τ min {t − t¯B ; 1 − t} shopping at B; store B is closed.
(1)
The parameter β measures a consumer’s basic utility derived from the consumption of the retail
service. The parameter λ > 0, which we refer to as the location parameter, formally measures
the transportation cost per unit of distance. More generally, this parameter captures the disutility
1To simplify our calculations we rule out a reservation utility, which means that all consumers must go shopping
in one of the stores.
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an individual experiences from consuming a retail service diﬀerent from his ideal choice. The
parameter τ > 0, which we refer to as the value-of-time parameter, measures the per-unit-of-
time disutility an individual experiences when he has to adjust the shopping time if the store is
closed at the ideal time for this consumer. In terms of interpretation we can think of the parameter
τ as a measure of shoppers’ inﬂexibility to adjust their business transactions to take place while
shops are open. The utility function (1) highlights the decision problem faced by shoppers if their
ideal time happens to be when a store is closed. The shopper can either advance the shopping
to the closing hour t¯i of store i, or shopping can be postponed until the store reopens at t = 0
(same as t = 1). Formally, these shoppers choose the minimal arc distance which we write as
min {t − t¯i ; 1 − t}, for consumers indexed by t¯i < t < 1.
2.2 Stores
Store A is located at point x = 0 and shop B at point x = 1. Each store competes with two
strategic instruments: The price, pi, and the closing hour, t¯i, i = A,B. To keep the model
simple we restrict shops’ decisions with respect to their closing hours t¯i (i = A,B) according to
the following assumption.
Assumption 1
(a) The density of night shoppers does not exceed the density of day shoppers. Formally, n2 ≤ n1.
(b) Both stores open at t = 0. Stores must choose whether to open full-time (t¯i = 1), or
half-time (t¯i = 12), i = A,B.
(c) A store’s total costs of operating full-time and half-time are kfull and khalf respectively, where
kfull > khalf .
Assumption 1(a) represents an analytically convenient way to capture the basic feature of regular
ﬂuctuations between phases of high demand and low demand within the period. In Shy and
Stenbacka (2004) we explore more complicated classes of consumer distribution functions by
sacriﬁcing price competition. Assumption 1(c) represents a very general description of the costs
associated with nonstop and part-time opening hours, respectively. This assumption only says that
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the operating costs of nonstop shopping hours exceed those associated with part-time opening
hours. However, Assumption 1(c) does not postulate whether the per-hourly costs of operating
the retail activity are increasing or decreasing as a function of the business hours. If kfull < 2khalf
the retail activity exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect to the opening hours, that is,
the cost per unit of time of operation is decreasing as a function of the length of the business
operation. Conversely, if kfull > 2khalf the per-hourly costs of retailing increase as a function of
the opening hours. This may apply to retail markets where labor market regulation mandates that
the stores pay overtime compensation or compensation for “uncomfortable” working hours. This
could also capture, for example, additional costs for security arrangements during “late hours.”
The competition between the stores takes place within the framework of a two-stage interac-
tion:
Stage I: Stores A and B commit to their closing hours t¯A and t¯B, simultaneously.
Stage II: Stores take closing hours as given, and simultaneously set their prices pA and pB.
Stages I and II are completed before the clock turns t = 0 when both stores open.
2.3 Classiﬁcation of shoppers
Our investigation will focus on three types of shoppers (analyzed separately).
Definition 1
We say that shoppers are
(a) Bi-directional if they can either advance or postpone their shopping if the store is closed at
their ideal shopping time.
(b) Forward-oriented if they can postpone their shopping beyond their ideal time, but cannot
advance their shopping to an earlier time.
(c) Backward-oriented if they can advance their shopping time earlier than their ideal time, but
cannot postpone it.
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The utility function (1) actually represents bi-directional shoppers as they can either advance or
postpone their shopping. This behavior implies that a shopper with an ideal time t bears a time
cost of τ regardless of whether she postpones her shopping to t +  or, whether she advances
her shopping to an earlier time t − . However, in modern economies many institutions impose
limitations on individuals’ ability to adjust their schedules to short business hours. For example,
it may be almost impossible for a teacher to reschedule lectures, whereas critical negotiations on
a substantial deal might make it very costly for businessmen to ﬁt shopping into their schedule.
These simply examples illustrate the general feature that individuals might have limited ﬂexibility
to adjust themselves to highly restricted business hours and that the disutility of advancing
shopping activities may very well diﬀer from that associated with postponing these activities. To
formally capture these features in an analytically tractable way we next introduce forward- and
backward-oriented consumers.
Recall that t¯i is the closing hour of store i, i = A,B. Then, the utility function (1) can
be modiﬁed to capture backward-oriented or forward-oriented consumers by replacing the terms
τ min{t − t¯i , 1 − t} in the utility function by the backward and forward time cost functions,
B(t, t¯i)
def= τ(t − t¯i) and F (t, t¯i) def= τ(1 − t) for all t > t¯i, (2)
respectively. Thus, if shoppers are forward-oriented, the function F applies, as it indicates that
the cost of postponing their shopping time is proportional to the unit time cost parameter, τ ,
whereas the option of advancing the shopping is eliminated. In contrast, the B function applies
if shoppers are backward-oriented as it indicates that the option of postponing the shopping to
a later time does not exist. The asymmetry between the functions B and F as deﬁned in (2)
follows from the requirement that both stores open at t = 0 thereby making stores diﬀer only in
their closing hours, t¯A and t¯B.
Of course, restrictions on consumers to adjust their shopping time to stores’ opening hours
could be captured in much more general ways. One option could be to capture the disutility
associated with adjustments forwards with a parameter τf , which could very well diﬀer from the
8
corresponding parameter τb measuring the disutility associated with adjustments backwards.2 In
this respect our introduction of forward- and backward oriented consumers serve merely as a
ﬁrst coarse approximation highlighting the potential asymmetry between the disutilities caused
by advancing and postponing the transactions.
3. Equilibrium Prices Under Identical Closing Hours
In this section we assume that both stores close at the same time, t¯ = t¯A = t¯B, where either
t¯ = 12 , or t¯ = 1. Section 3.1 analyzes bi-directional consumers, whereas Section 3.2 focuses on
forward- and backward-oriented shoppers.
3.1 Bi-directional shoppers
Figure 3 illustrates two possible equilibrium conﬁgurations. Under identical closing hours, all
0
t¯ = 12
3
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
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Figure 3: Equilibrium conﬁgurations under identical closing hours with bi-directional shoppers.
Left: Both open part time. Right: Both open full time.
consumers indexed by x < 12 shop at store A whereas all consumers indexed by x >
1
2 shop at
2Direction-dependent diﬀerentiation parameters were proposed earlier in Shy (1996, Ex.3 on p.165).
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store B. In addition, as indicated on Figure 3(left), when both stores open for half time only,
shoppers indexed by 12 < t <
3
4 advance their shopping to the stores’ closing hour t¯ =
1
2 , whereas
shoppers indexed by 34 < t < 1 postpone their shopping to the next day’s opening hour t = 0.
Clearly, as indicated in Figure 3(right), if both stores are open nonstop all buyers conduct their
shopping at their ideal times.
Assume that stores A and B charge retail prices pA and pB, respectively. From (1), we
can conclude that during the time interval when stores maintain parallel operations the equation
β − pA − λx = β − pB − λ(1 − x) implicitly determines the location of a consumer who is
indiﬀerent between shopping at A and B. Hence, the location of such an indiﬀerent consumer is
given by
xˆ =
1
2
+
pB − pA
2λ
, t ≤ min{t¯A, t¯B}. (3)
Clearly, the ideal time t does not appear in (3) since stores are either both open or both closed,
and therefore only location and prices aﬀect consumers’ decisions on where to shop. Given t¯,
each store chooses its price to solve
max
pA
πA = (pA − c)n1 + n22 xˆ − k and maxpB πB = (pB − c)
n1 + n2
2
(1 − xˆ) − k, (4)
where k = khalf if t¯ = 12 , and k = kfull if t¯ = 1. Substituting (3) into (4), the equilibrium prices
and proﬁt levels are given by
pA = pB = c + λ, πA = πB =
λ(n1 + n2)
4
− k, for k ∈ {khalf , kfull}. (5)
Thus, when stores maintain parallel opening hours, their revenue is unaﬀected by the opening
hours. Consequently,
Proposition 1
With parallel opening hours, both stores earn a higher proﬁt when they both restrict their opening
hours to part-time compared with both operating full-time.
In light of Proposition 1 we can conclude that retailers would have a common incentive to
coordinate their business hours so as to reach cost reductions through short business hours.
Such business hours coordination would take place at the expense of increased inconvenience for
consumers.
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3.2 Forward- and backward-oriented shoppers
We now turn to analyzing forward- and backward-oriented shoppers (see Deﬁnition 1) under the
assumption that both stores maintain identical business hours. Figure 4 illustrates two possible
equilibrium conﬁgurations when both stores are open part time only. Comparing Figure 4 with
0
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3
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.
...............
A B
Postpone to
t = 1
Advance to
t = 12


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..
.
0
t¯ = 12
3
4
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A B


1
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Figure 4: Equilibrium conﬁgurations under part-time operation with forward- or backward-oriented
shoppers. Left: Forward-oriented shoppers. Right: Backward-oriented shoppers.
Figure 3 reveals that under symmetric operations there is no diﬀerence in shoppers’ allocation
between the stores. This implies that prices and proﬁts are the same as for bi-directional shoppers.
This means that the prices and proﬁt levels given by (4) also hold for the present case.
4. Equilibrium Prices Under Diﬀerent Closing Hours
Suppose now that store A operates part-time, hence closes at t¯A = 12 , whereas store B is open
nonstop. Technically, this means that B closes at t¯B = 1 (and reopens immediately).
4.1 Bi-directional shoppers
Figure 5 illustrates two possible equilibrium conﬁgurations when shoppers are bi-directional. The
11
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Figure 5: Asymmetric closing hours equilibrium conﬁgurations: Left: Low value of time or high trans-
portation cost. Right: High value of time or low transportation cost (ruled out by Assump-
tion 2).
equilibrium displayed in Figure 5(left) has some consumers of any ideal shopping time t shopping
at A. Such a conﬁguration is possible if transportation costs (horizontal diﬀerentiation) is suﬃ-
ciently important relative to value of time for those shoppers indexed around t = 34 . In contrast,
Figure 5(right) displays closely-located stores (or a high value of time), where all consumers
indexed near t = 34 shop at B simply because B is the only store that is open.
As it turned out, the equilibrium displayed in Figure 5(right) does not have a closed-form
solution. In the present analysis we will focus on the equilibrium displayed in Figure 5(left) by
making the following assumption.
Assumption 2
The value of time parameter is bounded relative to the transportation cost parameter.
Formally,
τ <
12λ(n1 + n2)
3n1 + 2n2
.
During the time interval when both stores are open, the shoppers who are indiﬀerent between
A and B are indexed by xˆ already computed in (3). For the time interval when only store B is
open,A-shoppers who are indiﬀerent between advancing their shopping to t¯A = 12 and postponing
their shopping to t = 1 are implicitly deﬁned by β −pA −λx− τ(t− 12) = β −pA −λx− τ(1− t)
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yielding t = 34 . Deﬁne by x˜ the shoppers who are indiﬀerent between adjusting their shopping
time to A and shopping at B at their ideal time. Formally x˜ solves
β − λ(1 − x˜) − pB = β − λx˜ − pA − τ
(
3
4
− 1
2
)
, yielding x˜ =
4(pb − pA + λ) − τ
8λ
. (6)
Next, Figure 5(left) implies that the total number of people shopping at A and B are given
by
qA =
n1xˆ
2
+
n2x˜
2
+
n2(xˆ − x˜)
4
and qB =
(n1
2
+
n2
2
)
(1 − xˆ) + n2(xˆ − x˜)
4
. (7)
Substituting (3) and (6) into (7) yields
qA =
n1(pB − pA + λ)
4λ
+
n2(8pB − 8pA + 8λ − τ)
32λ
(8)
qB =
8n1(pA − pB + λ) + n2(8pA − 8pB + 8λ + τ)
32λ
.
Each store i then chooses its price pi to maximize πi = (pi − c)qi. The unique Nash equilibrium
with respect to prices is given by
pbiA =
24c(n1 + n2) + 24n1λ + n2(24λ − τ)
24(n1 + n2)
and pbiB =
24c(n1 + n2) + 24n1λ + n2(24λ + τ)
24(n1 + n2)
.
(9)
The implied equilibrium proﬁts are then
πbiA =
[24n1λ + n2(24λ − τ)]2
2304λ(n1 + n2)
− khalf and πbiB =
[24n1λ + n2(24λ + τ)]2
2304λ(n1 + n2)
− kfull. (10)
Substituting the equilibrium prices (9) into (8) yields the number of shoppers
qbiA =
24n1λ + n2(24λ − τ)
96λ
and qbiB =
24n1λ + n2(24λ + τ)
96λ
. (11)
Finally, substituting the equilibrium prices (9) into (3) and (6) yields the cutoﬀ shoppers as
illustrated in Figure 5(left).
xˆbi =
12n1λ + n2(12λ + τ)
24λ(n1 + n2)
and x˜bi =
3n1(4λ − τ) + 2n2(6(λ − τ)
24λ(n1 + n2)
. (12)
In view of Figure 5, we must verify that xˆ − x˜ = τ/8λ > 0. We are now ready to summarize the
ﬁndings of this section.
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Proposition 2
Suppose that store A is open part-time whereas store B operates nonstop. Also, assume that
all shoppers are bi-directional. Then, the store with longer business hours charges a higher price
(pB > pA) and serves more customers (qB > qA). However, during the time period when both
stores are open, store B has a lower market share (xˆ > 12).
Comparing the equilibrium prices (9), equilibrium sales (11), and revenues given by the ﬁrst
terms of (10), reveals that the asymmetry between A’s and B’s equilibrium values disappears
when the density of night shoppers, n2, approaches zero. Furthermore, the diﬀerences between
the equilibrium prices pB − pA as well as the equilibrium sales qB − qA increase monotonically
with n2.
4.2 Forward- and backward-oriented shoppers
Suppose again that store A operates part-time (t¯A = 12) whereas store B operates full-time
(t¯B = 1). Figure 6 displays two equilibrium conﬁgurations for forward- and backward-oriented
shoppers. Comparing Figure 6(left) with Figure 5(left) reveals that forward-oriented A-shoppers
located to the right and near t¯A = 12 have the longest waiting time, as compared with t =
3
4 for
bi-directional consumers. The upward sloping part for t > 12 means that as the time gets closer
to A’s reopening hour, more and more shoppers prefer to postpone their shopping to t = 1.
The dashed lines in Figure 6 display the market division under backward-oriented consumers.
In this case, A-shoppers located near and to the left of t = 1 have the longest time needed to
advance their shopping to A’s closing hour t¯A = 12 .
Forward- and backward-oriented shoppers yield the same equilibrium allocation of the number
of shoppers, prices and proﬁts.3 For this reason, we sketch only the derivation of the equilibrium
with forward-oriented shoppers. In addition, Assumption 2 (needed to obtain the equilibrium
illustrated on Figure 6(left)) can be relaxed to τ < 6λ(n1 + n2)/(3n1 + 2n2). Under this
assumption, the indiﬀerent shopper xˆ is already given in (3). The shoppers indexed by x˜ in
3Intuitively, this feature is graphically captured in Figure 6(left) by the fact that the solid and dashed lines are
mirror images of each other on the time interval 12 ≤ t ≤ 1.
14
10
0 12 1


x
t
1
0
0 12 1


x
t
B-shoppers
A-shoppers
B-shoppers
A-shoppers
A
xˆ
xˆ
xˆ
x˜
Figure 6: Equilibrium conﬁgurations under part-time operation with forward- and backward-oriented
shoppers. Left: Low value of time or high transportation cost. Right: High value of time or
low transportation cost (not analyzed). Remark: Solid lines (forward), dashed lines (back-
ward).
Figure 6(left) are found by equating the utility of a t = 12 consumer shopping at B (with no
delay) with the utility of shopping at A (with a delay of 1 − 12). Formally, β − λ(1 − x˜) − pB =
β − λx − pA − τ(1 − 12), or x˜ = [2(pB − pA + λ) + τ ]/(4λ). The number of A-shoppers is then
given by qA = n1xˆ12 + n2x˜
1
2 + n2(xˆ − x˜)/4, and qB = (n1 + n2)(1 − xˆ)12 + n2(xˆ − x˜)/4. Each
store i chooses pi to maximize πi = (pi − c)qi yielding equilibrium prices given by
p
f/b
A =
12c(n1 + n2) + 12n1λ + n2(12λ − τ)
12(n1 + n2)
(13)
p
f/b
B =
12c(n1 + n2) + 12n1λ + n2(12λ + τ)
12(n1 + n2)
.
The equilibrium numbers of shoppers at each store are
q
f/b
A =
12n1λ + n2(12λ − τ)
48λ
and qf/bB =
12n1λ + n2(12λ + τ)
48λ
. (14)
Then, the equilibrium proﬁt levels are
π
f/b
A =
[12n1λ + n2(12λ − τ)]2
576λ(n1 + n2)
− khalf and πf/bB =
[12n1λ + n2(12λ + τ)]
2
576λ(n1 + n2)
− kfull. (15)
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Finally, the indiﬀerent shoppers described in Figure 6(left) are indexed by
xˆf/b =
6n1λ + n2(6λ + τ)
12λ(n1 + n2)
and x˜f/b =
3n1(2λ − τ) + 2n2(3λ − τ)
12λ(n1 + n2)
. (16)
Proposition 2 can be easily veriﬁed for the present case (forward-oriented) by computing that
qB − qA = n2τ/(24λ) > 0 and pB − pA = n2τ/[6(n1 + n2)] > 0, and that xˆ > 1/2. Hence, we
do not formally restate this proposition. However, it is interesting to compare how these quantity
and price diﬀerences vary between bi-directional and forward/backward oriented shoppers. This
comparison is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
(a) The store that opens full-time charges a higher price, has more customers, and earns a higher
proﬁt under forward/backward oriented shoppers compared with bi-directional shoppers.
Formally, pf/bB > p
bi
B , q
f/b
B > q
bi
B , and π
f/b
B > π
bi
B .
(b) The store that opens part time charges a lower price, has fewer customers, and earns lower
proﬁt under forward/backward oriented shoppers compared with bi-directional shoppers.
Formally, pf/bA < p
bi
A , q
f/b
A < q
bi
A , and π
f/b
A < π
bi
A .
With forward- or backward-oriented consumers, the advantage of the nonstop-operating store
increases compared with bi-directional shoppers. The monopoly power of shop B on the time
interval [12 , 1] increases as the average waiting time for A-shoppers increases.
5. Equilibrium Business Hours
In this section we solve for the equilibrium business hours. In particular, we wish to characterize
the conditions under which a symmetric retail industry generates an asymmetric equilibrium in
business hours.
Table 1 displays stores’ proﬁt levels under part-time and full-time operations for bi-directional
shoppers.
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Store B:
A Half-time Full-time
Half λ(n1+n2)4 − khalf λ(n1+n2)4 − khalf [24n1λ+n2(24λ−τ)]
2
2304λ(n1+n2)
− khalf [24n1λ+n2(24λ+τ)]22304λ(n1+n2) − kfull
Full [24n1λ+n2(24λ+τ)]
2
2304λ(n1+n2)
− kfull [24n1λ+n2(24λ−τ)]22304λ(n1+n2) − khalf
λ(n1+n2)
4 − kfull λ(n1+n2)4 − kfull
Table 1: Proﬁt levels under bi-directional shoppers
We will be using the following notation: ∆k def= kfull − khalf as well as
∆kbiL
def=
n2τ [48n1λ + n2(48λ − τ)]
2304λ(n1 + n2)
and ∆kbiH
def=
n2τ [48n1λ + n2(48λ + τ)]
2304λ(n1 + n2)
. (17)
We can now state the following proposition (restricting our investigation to pure actions only).
Proposition 4
Suppose that shoppers are bi-directional. If the diﬀerence between the cost of operating full-time
and part-time is high (∆k > ∆kbiH) then both operating part-time is a unique equilibrium. If
this diﬀerence is low (∆k < ∆kbiL ) then both stores operate nonstop. For intermediate cost
diﬀerences (∆kbiL ≤ ∆k ≤ ∆kbiH) there are two asymmetric equilibria where one store opens
part-time while the other is open nonstop.
Proposition 4 is rather intuitive as it states that if operating full-time is very costly relative to
operating part-time, then no store will deviate from part-time operation. The reverse logic holds
for a low cost diﬀerence between full- and part-time operation, in which case both stores open
nonstop. Clearly, the most interesting case is the intermediate cost diﬀerence where the extra
cost of operating full-time can be borne by one and only one store that enjoys a limited monopoly
power during night hours business. In these equilibria, the store that opens part-time has lower
revenues and a lower cost of operation.
We next characterize the equilibria with forward- and backward-oriented shoppers. Table 2
displays stores’ proﬁt levels under part-time and full-time operations-
Similar to (17), we deﬁne
∆kf/bL
def=
n2τ [24n1λ + n2(24λ − τ)]
576λ(n1 + n2)
and ∆kf/bH
def=
n2τ [24n1λ + n2(24λ + τ)]
576λ(n1 + n2)
. (18)
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Store B:
A Half-time Full-time
Half λ(n1+n2)4 − khalf λ(n1+n2)4 − khalf [12n1λ+n2(12λ−τ)]
2
576λ(n1+n2)
− khalf [12n1λ+n2(12λ+τ)]2576λ(n1+n2) − kfull
Full [12n1λ+n2(12λ+τ)]
2
576λ(n1+n2)
− kfull [12n1λ+n2(12λ−τ)]2576λ(n1+n2) − khalf
λ(n1+n2)
4 − kfull λ(n1+n2)4 − kfull
Table 2: Proﬁt levels under forward- and backward-oriented shoppers
Proposition 5
Suppose that shoppers are either forward- or backward-oriented. If the diﬀerence between the
cost of operating full-time and part-time is high (∆k > ∆kf/bH ) then both operating part-time is
a unique equilibrium. If this diﬀerence is low (∆k < ∆kf/bL ) then both stores operate nonstop.
Otherwise (∆kf/bL ≤ ∆k ≤ ∆kf/bH ) there are two equilibria where one store opens part-time while
the other is opened nonstop.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is identical to the intuition behind Proposition 4, except for
the magnitudes of the cost diﬀerences that we analyze below and illustrate in Figure 7.

 ∆k
∆k
∆kf/bH∆k
f/b
L
∆kbiH∆k
bi
L
t¯A = t¯B = 12
1
2
t¯A = 12 , t¯B = 1 and t¯A = 1, t¯B =
1
2
t¯A = 12 , t¯B = 1 and t¯A = 1, t¯B =
1
2t¯A = t¯B = 1
1
Figure 7: Equilibrium conﬁgurations as functions of operating cost diﬀerence: Top: Bi-directional shop-
pers. Bottom: Forward/backward oriented shoppers.
By directly comparing (17) with (18) we can conclude that ∆kbiL < ∆k
f/b
L , thereby conﬁrming
Figure 7. This means that a retail industry facing consumers with limited shopping hour ﬂexibility
will maintain an equilibrium business hour conﬁguration with nonstop operation for higher cost
diﬀerentials of operation ∆k = kfull − khalf . This captures the intuition that the strategic beneﬁt
of nonstop operation as a response to nonstop operation on behalf of the rival is increased as the
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intertemporal ﬂexibility of the consumers is reduced. Analogously, direct comparisons reveal that
∆kbiH < ∆k
f/b
H , as also illustrated in Figure 7. This means that the threshold with respect to the
diﬀerential in the cost of operation ∆k = kfull − khalf for the retail industry to switch to parallel
part-time operation is higher when the consumers have more limited shopping hour ﬂexibility.
Again this relationship captures the intuition that the strategic beneﬁt of nonstop operation as a
response to part-time operation on behalf of the rival is higher when the consumers have lower
shopping time ﬂexibility.
The overall lesson to be learned from these comparisons is that the equilibrium conﬁgura-
tion with respect to the business hours survives across environments where the consumers have
diﬀerent shopping hour ﬂexibility. However, when the consumers have reduced shopping hour
ﬂexibility the strategic return to extended business hours increase. For that reason our theoretical
prediction is that the frequency of part-time business hours is reduced when the limitations on
the consumers’ adjustments to restricted business hours become more severe.
6. Regulation of Business Hours
From an economic perspective business hour regulations should typically be imposed if there is
some form of a market failure such that the equilibrium conﬁguration represents a bias relative to
the socially optimal business hours. Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus and
industry proﬁts. Within the context of our model prices are merely transfers from shoppers to
stores. Therefore, the welfare properties of an equilibrium conﬁguration with respect to business
hours have to be evaluated along the following three dimensions:
(a) The social costs of adjusting shopping to the business hours. This aggregate cost, propor-
tional to the value-of-time parameter τ , measures the social costs from consumers advancing
their shopping to a store’s closing hour or delaying their shopping to a store’s opening hour.
(b) The aggregate transportation costs. This aggregate cost, proportional to the parameter λ,
measures the aggregate disutility caused by the horizontal diﬀerentiation which requires the
consumers to travel to a store.
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(c) The aggregate cost of operations. Business hour decisions are sensitive to the cost diﬀerential
between part-time and nonstop operations ∆k = kfull − khalf .
We initially evaluate the welfare implications of symmetric equilibria with parallel operations, i.e.,
conﬁgurations in which both duopolists operate either part-time or nonstop. For this purpose we
ﬁrst explore the case of bi-directional consumers. In light of Figure 3, the social costs of adjusting
shopping to the business hours (Loss of Value of Time) is
LV T bi1
2 ,
1
2
= n2τ
3
4∫
1
2
(
t − 1
2
)
dt + n2τ
1∫
3
4
(1 − t) dt = n2τ
16
, (19)
if both stores are open part-time.
For forward-oriented shoppers, comparing Figure 4 with Figure 3 reveals that forward- and
backward-oriented shoppers have to advance/postpone their shopping for more hours compared
with bi-directional shoppers. In fact, for these consumers, the aggregate loss of time (19) becomes
LV T
f/b
1
2 ,
1
2
= n2τ
1∫
1
2
(
t − 1
2
)
dt =
n2τ
8
= 2LV T bi1
2 ,
1
2
. (20)
Clearly full-day opening hours socially dominates part-time operation of both stores if and
only if the extra cost associated with longer hours is lower than the aggregate time loss under
part-time operations. Formally,
Proposition 6
Suppose that shoppers are bi-directional (forward or backward oriented). Then nonstop opening
hours dominate part-time opening hours from a social point of view if and only if
∆k ≤ ∆kˆbi def=
LV T bi1
2 ,
1
2
2
=
n2τ
32

∆k ≤ ∆kˆf/b def= LV T
f/b
1
2 ,
1
2
2
=
n2τ
16

 . (21)
Thus, from Proposition 6 we can conclude that society is more likely to be better oﬀ with nonstop
operation rather than part-time operation the (a) higher is the value-of-time parameter τ , (b)
higher is n2 (i.e., a higher shopper density during the night) and (c) lower is ∆k = kfull − khalf .
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We next evaluate whether there are economic reasons to restrict business hours. In other
words, can it happen that the duopolistic industry would shift to nonstop operations under
circumstances when part-time operation would be socially optimal? By comparing (17) and (18)
with (21), respectively, we can conclude that ∆kˆbi > ∆kˆbiH and ∆kˆ
f/b > ∆kˆf/bH . Consequently,
nonstop operation is socially optimal in all those circumstances where the duopolistic business
hour equilibrium induces nonstop operation. We formulate this conclusion in
Proposition 7
With parallel opening hours the duopolistic equilibrium always induces underprovision of business
hours.
From Proposition 7 we can immediately conclude that policies that restrict the maximum business
hours cannot be justiﬁed by reference to our welfare analysis. Such a conclusion seems intuitive,
because the source of the market failure is that the duopolistic industry does not internalize the
social costs borne by those consumers, who have to adjust their shopping so as to take place
during the business hours.
Our welfare analysis so far was restricted to the conﬁgurations with parallel opening hours.
As shown in Section 5 the business hour equilibrium will exhibit asymmetric closing hours for an
intermediate interval of the cost diﬀerential between part-time and nonstop operation. Overall,
the formal computation of social welfare when stores maintain diﬀerent business hours is very
tedious and might not therefore be very useful for comparisons with equilibrium outcomes for the
purpose of identifying market failures. Any welfare evaluation of asymmetric business hours will
easily lead to fairly involved comparisons with respect to the consequences in three dimensions:
(a) the social costs of adjusting shopping to the business hours, (b) the aggregate transportation
costs and (c) the costs of operations. In fact, Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate that any equilibrium
with unequal closing hours is associated with higher aggregate transportation costs than any
equilibrium with parallel operations. Thus, the welfare evaluations lead to comparisons where the
consequences for the social transportation costs have to be traded oﬀ relative to the social costs
of adjusting shopping to the business hours.
21
7. Conclusion
In this manuscript we analyzed a duopolistic diﬀerentiated retail industry where shops engage
in two-stage competition with respect to business hours and prices. In the price equilibrium
retailers with longer opening hours charge higher prices, but they nevertheless have a higher
overall market share when evaluated over the whole time period. We characterized the symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium in closing hours and demonstrated that the cost increases associated
with extended business hours determine the possible equilibrium conﬁgurations. For example, we
demonstrated that the equilibrium business hours are asymmetric for an intermediate range of
costs for business hour expansions.
We focused particularly on the relationship between the emerging business hour equilibrium
and the ﬂexibility of consumers to adjust their shopping times. We did this by comparing the
business hour equilibrium when consumers are bi-directional to the equilibrium conﬁguration
generated by forward- or backward oriented consumers. Overall, we found a negative relationship
between consumers’ shopping hour ﬂexibility and the strategic returns to retailers from extended
business hours. Lastly, we conducted a welfare analysis to explore whether there is a need to
impose restrictions on the maximal number of business hours. We established that duopolistic
competition induces underprovision of business hours. In this respect our model does not lend
support for restrictions on shopping hours and this conclusion holds true irrespectively of the
degree of ﬂexibility of consumers to adjust their shopping to the business hours.
Our analysis and the potential limitations imposed by the stylized model invite generalizations
and extensions along several dimensions. We explored the eﬀects of customers’ shopping hour
ﬂexibility by comparing bi-directional consumers with forward- or backward-oriented consumers.
An analytically more complete way of analyzing these eﬀects would be to consider a whole range
of possible values for the value-of-time parameter τ . A more detailed analysis in this respect might
be particularly interesting for predicting the plausible consequences for business hours of future
anticipated changes in the organization of work with extended possibilities for out-of-the-oﬃce
working arrangements.
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Our analysis was restricted to business hour arrangements involving either nonstop or half-
time operations. In this respect the model could be extended to capture more general forms of
part-time operations, where the part-time option could capture any proportion of the time period.
Such an extension could be particularly interesting if one wants to further explore the nature of
the way in which opening hour diﬀerentiation softens price competition.
Finally, our way of specifying ideal shopping times might not capture all central aspects of
opening hour competition. Namely, extensive opening hours might incorporate a real options
value by creating ﬂexibility in the eyes of consumers, who are ex ante uncertain about precisely
when they want to shop. Inclusion of such aspects of ﬂexibility seems to obviously reinforce our
policy conclusions, but it would be interesting to explore the eﬀect on the market provision of
business hours.
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